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Abstract. It has been argued that security concerns should inform all 
the stages of the development process of an agent-based system. 
However, this is not the case since current agent-oriented 
methodologies do not, usually, consider security concepts within their 
modelling ontology. In this paper we present extensions to the Tropos 
ontology to enable it to model security. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Following the wide recognition of multi-agent systems, agent-oriented software 
engineering has been introduced as a major field of research. Many agent-oriented 
software engineering methodologies have been proposed [1,2] each one of those 
offering different approaches in modelling multi-agent systems.  
It has been argued [3] that security issues should inform all the stages of the 
development of agent-based systems. However, usually, this is not the case. One of 
the reasons is the lack of concepts and notations employed by the current 
methodologies to help towards the inclusion of security within the development 
stages. In other words, agent oriented software engineering methodologies do not, 
usually, integrate security concepts within their ontology.   
In this paper we describe how the Tropos ontology has been extended to consider 
security issues. Section 2 of the paper provides an overview of Tropos ontology, and 
Section 3 identifies the need to extend the methodology to consider security issues. 
Section 4 describes the newly introduced (security) concepts and Section 5 concludes 
the paper and presents directions for future work.   
2. TROPOS 
Tropos [2] is an information system development methodology, tailored to 
describe both the organisational environment of a system and the system itself, 
employing the same concepts throughout the development stages. Tropos ontology is 
described at three levels of granularity [4] and is inspired by social and organisational 
structures. At the first level (lowest), Tropos ontology adopts components from the i* 
modelling framework [5], which is based on the concepts of actors, goals, soft goals, 
tasks, resources, and social dependencies.  Social dependencies represent obligations 
or agreements, called dependum, between two different actors called depender and 
dependee. To partially illustrate the modelling of the social dependencies between 
actors consider the eSAP System [6]. Such a system, involves four actors [6], namely 
Older Person, R&D Agency, Benefits Agency, Department of Health (DoH), and 
Professional (Figure 1). 
The depender is the depending actor and the dependee is the actor who is depended 
upon. For example in Figure 1, the Older Person depends on the Professional to fulfil 
the Receive Appropriate Care goal dependency. For this dependency, the Older 
Person is the depender, the Professional the dependee and the Receive Appropriate 
Care goal the dependum. Actors have strategic goals and intentions within the system 
or the organisation and represent (social) agents (organisational, human or software), 
roles or positions (represent a set of roles). A goal represents the strategic interests of 
an actor. In Tropos we differentiate between hard (only goals hereafter) and soft 
goals. The latter having no clear definition or criteria for deciding whether they are 
satisfied or not. A task represents a way of doing something. Thus, for example a task 
can be executed in order to satisfy a goal. A resource represents a physical or an 
informational entity while a dependency between two actors indicates that one actor 
depends on another to accomplish a goal, execute a task, or deliver a resource.   
At the second level, Tropos ontology provides a set of organisational styles 
inspired by organisation theory and strategic alliances [4]. These styles are used to 
describe the overall architecture of the organisational context of the system or its 
architecture. The last element of the Tropos ontology consists of social patterns [4]. 
These patterns, unlike organisational styles, are focused on the social structure 
necessary to achieve a particular goal instead of the overall goals of the organisation. 
 
Fig. 1. The social Dependencies between the stakeholders of the eSAP system. 
 
In addition to the graphical representation, Tropos provides a formal specification 
language called Formal Tropos [7]. Formal Tropos compliments i* by defining a 
textual notation for i* models and allow us to describe dynamic constraints among the 
different elements of the specification in a first order linear-time temporal logic [7].  
3. (LACK OF) SECURITY ONTOLOGY IN TROPOS 
As we have been argued in a previous paper [3], the Tropos methodology needs to 
be extended in order to adequately model security. The current Tropos ontology 
provides developers the ability to model security requirements as soft goals. The 
concept of a soft goal is “used to model quality attributes for which there are no a 
priori, clear criteria for satisfaction, but are judged by actors as being sufficiently 
met” [5]. However, security requirements may relate to system’s quality properties, or 
alternatively may define constraints on the system [8]. Qualities are properties or 
characteristics of the system that its stakeholders care about, while constraints are 
restrictions, rules or conditions imposed to the system and unlike qualities are 
(theoretically) non negotiable. Thus, although the concept of a soft goal captures 
qualities, it fails to adequately capture constraints [3]. Security constraints might 
affect the analysis and design of the system, by restricting some alternative design 
solutions, conflict with some of the requirements of the system, and also by refining 
some of the goals of the system or introducing new ones that help the system towards 
the satisfaction of the constraint.  
We believe the current Tropos ontology must be extended towards three main 
directions. Firstly, the concept of a security constraint must be introduced, as a 
separate concept, next to the existing concepts of Tropos. Secondly, existing concepts 
such as goals, tasks, resources, must be defined with and without security in mind. For 
example a goal should be differentiated from a secure goal, the latter representing a 
goal that affects the security of the system. Thirdly, security-engineering concepts 
such as security features, protection objectives, security mechanisms and threats, 
which are widely used in security engineering, must be introduced in the Tropos 
ontology, in order to make the methodology applicable by software engineers as well 
as security engineers. In this paper, due to lack of space, we only present the 
extensions towards the first two directions. Readers interested in how security-
engineering concepts are integrated within Tropos methodology should refer to [3]. 
4. SECURITY CONCEPTS  
Security Constraints  
We define security constraint as a constraint that is related to the security of the 
system. Since constraints can influence the security of the system either positively 
(e.g., Allow Access Only to Personal Record) or negatively (e.g., Send Record Plain 
Text, not encrypted), we further define positive and negative security constraints, 
respectively. 
In the early requirements analysis security constraints are identified and analysed 
according to the constraint analysis processes we have proposed in [9]. Security 
constraints are then imposed to different parts of the system, and possible conflicts 
between security and other (functional and non functional) requirements of the system 
are identified and solved. To identify these conflicts we differentiate between security 
constraints that contribute positively or negatively to the other requirements of the 
system. We consider a security constraint contributing to a higher level of abstraction. 
This means we are not taking into consideration specific security protocols that 
should be decided during the implementation of the system, and that most of the times 
restrict the design with the use of a particular implementation language.  
 
Secure Entities 
The term secure entities involves any secure goals, tasks and resources of the system. 
A secure entity is introduced to the actor (or the system) in order to help in the 
achievement of a security constraint. For example, if a health professional actor has 
the security constraint Share Info Only If Consent Obtained, the secure goal Obtain 
Patient Consent can be introduced to this actor in order to help in the achievement of 
the constraint.   
A secure goal does not particularly define how the security constraint can be 
achieved, since (as in the definition of goal, see [5]) alternatives can be considered. 
However, this is possible through a secure task, since a task specifies a way of doing 
something [5]. Thus, a secure task represents a particular way for satisfying a secure 
goal. For example, for the secure goal Check Authorisation, we might have secure 
tasks such as Check Password or Check Digital Signatures. 
A resource that is related to a secure entity or a security constraint is considered a 
secure resource. For example, an actor depends on another actor to receive some 
information and this dependency is restricted by a constraint Only Encrypted Info. 
 
 Secure Dependencies 
A secure dependency introduces security constraint(s), proposed either by the 
depender or the dependee in order to successfully satisfy the dependency. For 
example a Doctor (depender) depends on a Patient (dependee) to obtain Health 
Information (dependum). However, the Patient imposes a security constraint to the 
Doctor to share health information only if consent is achieved. Both the depender and 
the dependee must agree in this constraint for the secure dependency to be valid. That 
means, in the depender side, the depender expects from the dependee to satisfy the 
security constraints while in the dependee side, a secure dependency means that the 
dependee will make an effort to deliver the dependum by satisfying the security 
constraint(s). There are two degrees of security: Open Secure dependency (normal 
dependency) and Secure dependency. In an Open Secure Dependency [3] some 
security conditions might be introduced but if the dependee fail to satisfy them, the 
consequences will not be serious. This means that the security of the system will not 
be in danger if some of these conditions are not satisfied. On the other side, there are 
three different types of a secure dependency [3], Dependee Secure Dependency, 
Depender Secure Dependency, and Double Secure Dependency.  
Taking as an example the eSAP system illustrated in Section 2, the social 
dependencies between the actors of the system can be modelled now taking into 
account the security constraints between them as shown in figure 3. The Older Person 
depends on the Benefits Agency to Receive Financial Support. However, the Older 
Person worries about the privacy of their finances so they impose a constraint to the 
Benefits Agency actor, to keep their financial information private. The Professional 
depends on the Older Person to Obtain Information, however one of the most 
important and delicate matters for a patient (in our case the older person) is the 
privacy of their personal medical information, and the sharing of it. Thus most of the 
times the Professional is imposed a constraint to share this information if and only if 
consent is achieved.  In addition, one of the main goals of the R&D Agency is to 
Obtain Clinical Information in order to perform tests and research. To get this 
information the R&D Agency depends on the Professional. However, the Professional 
is imposed a constraint (by the Department of Health) to Keep Patient Anonymity.   
 
Fig. 3. Social dependencies between the eSAP stakeholders  
 
The security constraints imposed at each actor can be further analysed by 
identifying which goals of the actor they restrict [9]. For example, the Professional 
actor has been imposed two security constraints (Share Info Only If Consent Obtained 
and Keep Patient Anonymity). During the means-end analysis [1] of the Professional 
actor we have identified the Share Medical Info goal. However, this goal is restricted 
by the Share Info Only If Consent Obtained constraint imposed to the Professional by 
the Older Person. For the Professional to satisfy the constraint, a secure goal can be 
introduced such as Obtain Older Person Consent. However this goal can be achieved 
with many different ways, for example a Professional can obtain the consent 
personally or can ask a nurse to obtain the consent on their behalf. Thus a sub-
constraint can be introduced, Only Obtain Consent Personally. This sub constraint 
introduces another secure goal Personally Obtain Consent. This goal can be divided 
into two sub-tasks Obtain Consent by Mail or Obtain Consent by Phone. 
 
Formal Tropos 
Formal Tropos [7] complements graphical Tropos by extending the Tropos graphical 
language into a formal specification language [7]. The language offers all the 
primitive concepts of graphical Tropos, supplemented with a rich temporal 
specification language, inspired by KAOS [10], that has formal semantics and it is 
amenable to formal analysis. In addition, Formal Tropos offers a textual notation for 
i* models and allows the description of different elements of the specification in a 
first order linear-time temporal logic.  A specification of formal Tropos consists of a 
sequence of declarations of entities, actors, and dependencies [7]. 
Formal Tropos can be used to perform a formal analysis of the system and also 
verify the model of the system by employing formal verification techniques such as 
model checking to allow for an automatic verification of the system properties [7]. 
As with the graphical Tropos, Formal Tropos has not been conceived with security 
on mind. Thus, Formal Tropos fails to adequately model some security aspects (such 
as secure dependencies and security constraints). Extending Formal Tropos will allow 
us to perform a formal analysis of our introduced concepts and thus provide 
formalism to our approach. Towards this direction, we have extended Formal Tropos 
grammar [9] and below we present an example in which the secure dependency 
Obtain OP information between the Older Person and the Professional (Figure 3) is 
specified 
Entity HealthInformation 
 Attribute constant Record: Record 
Entity Record 
Attribute constant 
content: CarePlan ,accessControl: Boolean 
 patient: Patient, consent: boolean 
Security Constraint 
 ∃hi:HealthInformation  ((hi.record=self) → self.accessControl) 
Actor Professional 
 Attribute patients: PatientList  
Goal provideCare 
Creation condition 
∃ p: Patient (In(p,self.patients) ∧ ¬p.helthOK) 
Actor Older Person 
Attribute healthOK: boolean   
Goal MaintainGoodHealth 
 Creation condition ¬self.healthOK  
Security constraint 
 ∀ rec: Record ((rec.patient=self) → rec.accessControl ) 
Dependency ObtainOPInformation 
 Type Goal 
 Security Type Dependee  
 Mode Achieve and Maintain 
 Depender Professional 
 Dependee Older Person 
 Attribute constant   
 Creation condition  
In(self.dependee,self.depender.patients) ∧self.dependee.healthOK 
Security Constraint for depender  
∀ rec: Record ((rec.patient=dependee)  ∧ rec.consent) 
5 Conclusions and future work 
In this paper we have presented extensions to the Tropos ontology to enable it to 
model security issues.  Concepts and notations were introduced to the existing 
graphical Tropos and also Formal Tropos grammar was extended to provide 
formalism for our newly introduced concepts.  
During the process of extending the Tropos ontology we have reach some useful 
conclusions. By introducing the concepts of security constraints, functional, non-
functional and security requirements are defined together, however a clear distinction 
is provided. In addition, by considering the overall software development process it is 
easy to identify security requirements at the early requirements stage and propagate 
them until the implementation stage. This introduces a security-oriented paradigm to 
the software engineering process. Also the iterative nature of the methodology along 
with the security concepts allows the redefinition of security requirements in different 
levels therefore providing a better integration of security and system functionality.  
Our extensions only apply to the first level of the Tropos ontology. Future work 
involves the expansion of our approach to the other two levels of the Tropos ontology. 
We aim to provide a set of organisational styles and a pattern language that will help 
developers to consider security throughout the development of an agent-based system. 
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